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introduction
The topic of skill or practical expertise—of course a central one in ancient
philosophy—emerges in contemporary philosophy in several places. To mention
a few: in the debate, deriving from Ryle (1946, 1949) via Stanley and Williamson
(2001), about the form and content of ascriptions of “knowledge how” and the
nature and grounds of what is thereby ascribed; in discussions of the nature of
virtue both ethical (Annas 2011) and epistemic (Sosa 2015); in work that attends
to the phenomenology of skillful activity, “embodied coping”, and performance
“in flow” (Dreyfus 2014); and in the philosophy of action, where reflection on
the “pattern”, “structure”, “order”, or “architecture” of practical reasoning (and the
instrumentally complex courses of action it makes possible) suggests—to many,
at least—that there must be “basic actions”, and that basic actions are exercises of
skill.1 In many of these discussions, a central role is played by the idea that there is
a deep contrast between actions that are manifestations of skill and actions that are
manifestations of practical reasoning or deliberation. In this essay, I am interested
in a conception of skill and its exercises, and their relationship to practical reason
and deliberation, that arises in the last of these contexts: basic action—more
1See e.g. Hornsby (1980, 2005, 2013); Enç (2003); Setiya (2012); Lavin (2013).
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specifically, “teleologically basic” action (Hornsby 1980, ch. VI).2 Skill and basic
action appear here as foundational elements in a widely accepted picture of the
structure of rational agency: at a certain point practical reasoning stops and skill
takes over, issuing in actions that constitute the fundamental means by which we
execute more complex plans, but which themselves are performed, not by means of
doing something else, but “just like that”. Drawing on work by Thompson (2008)
and Lavin (2013), I will argue that the conceptions of skill and basic action that
figure in this picture are in fact incapable of playing the foundational role for which
they are required. Nevertheless, that requirement, to which Thompson and Lavin
are insufficiently sensitive, is real: if we cannot make sense of basic action, we
cannot make sense of intentional action at all. The dilemma is sharpened by the
fact that the very features of the conceptions of skill and basic action that render
them inadequate seem to flow directly from the sources of the requirement. We can
negotiate the dilemma, and articulate an acceptable conception of basic action, but
only by fundamentally rethinking the kind of contrast that obtains between skill
and deliberation.
The relevant pattern of practical reasoning, which mandates the introduction of a
concept of basic action, is that of means and ends. As Anscombe remarks, “[t]he
mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance from the imme-
diate action, and the immediate action is calculated as the way of getting or doing
or securing the thing wanted” (1963, §41). Most philosophers would agree with
Anscombe that calculation—means-end reasoning, deliberation—needn’t occur for
teleologically structured intentional action to take place; in talking of the pattern
of practical reasoning we speak not of a mental process but of “an order which is
there whenever actions are done with intentions” (§42, my emphasis). And most
would agree with Bratman (1987) that the whole pattern needn’t be in place before
action can begin: an action-plan may very often be “partial,” filled in along the way,
2It is beyond the scope of this discussion to engage either with conceptions of skill or practical
know-how that arise in other contexts or with non-teleological conceptions of basic action: hence-
forth, by “basic” I will mean teleologically basic. Two further terminological points are in order: (1)
What is basic might be an act-type—something an agent “knows how to do, and knows how to do
otherwise than on the basis of knowing how [it] is done by him” (Hornsby 1980, 84); or it might be
a token action—an action the agent performed “just like that”, without doing it by means of doing
anything else. Though these ideas are distinct, those who believe in practical “basicness” tend to
think that they come on the scene together (if they distinguish them). The distinction will become
salient in §4, though until then there is no need to be careful about it. (2) My use of expressions, in
this footnote and throughout, such as “performance of an action” (etc.) is merely expository; they
should not be read as suggesting that an agent stands in any active or performative relation to her
actions—as if she had both to do A and to “do” or “perform” her A-ing.
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when the time comes. Nevertheless, a moment’s reflection on the pattern suggests
that it is not self-standing: if deliberation is ever to issue in action, it must come to
an end; if a plan is to be executed, it must specify means that can be taken without
further planning; though we may do many things by means of doing other things,
there must be some things we “can just do” (i.e. without doing them by means of
doing other things). For without an “immediate action,” the end must remain “at a
distance.” Thus, on pain of regress, the very idea of means-end practical reasoning—
and therefore of the complex courses of intentional action that belong to rational
human agency—seems to call for a foundation. And one seems to be supplied by a
concept of skill and its exercise: more specifically, by a concept of a distinctive kind
of practical knowledge how to do things (one that does not consist in knowing that
one can do something by means of doing something else) and a concept of teleolog-
ically basic action (that is, of intentional action that lacks the innermeans-end artic-
ulation that characterizes those teleologically complex—or non-basic—intentional
actions that basic actions make possible).
I say a concept of skill for two reasons. On the one hand, the concept of a distinc-
tive kind of practical know-how that answers the philosophical demand expressed
by such regresses diverges both from concepts of skill (technê, etc.) found in other
areas of philosophy and from the ordinary concept of skill (which overlaps yet con-
trasts with concepts like know-how, art, habit, craft, trade, knack, profession, ability,
etc.). For instance, carpentry would, I imagine, ordinarily be thought of as a skill,
and it is the sort of thing Plato or Aristotle would have deemed a technê. But a skilled
carpenter will have lots of carpentry knowledge of the form “One can do B by doing
A”, and may put such knowledge into practice when she exercises her skills. On the
other hand, the features indicated by these regresses—the ideas that there is a kind
of practical know-how that cannot be (completely) articulated in sentences of the
form “One can do B by doing A”, that such knowledge can be “directly” (i.e. without
deliberation) put into practice, and that in exercising it an agent is not organizing
the details of her movements as means to ends—nevertheless seem to reflect central
aspects of both ordinary and philosophical invocations of skill. Indeed, it appears
that arguments for basic action seek to establish the necessity of something the ac-
tuality of which is already manifest in everyday practical experience: I can raise my
arm, sign my name, tie my shoelace, or play a C major scale on the piano “just like
that”, without having to think about how to do these things; and these are things I
know how to do, even if I cannot articulate a general plan, procedure, or recipe for
doing them.
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Here is how a representative selection of philosophers of action—with otherwise
strikingly different commitments—describe the exercise of skill in basic action:
Once the intention to tie one’s shoe lace is formed, no subsequent practical
reasoning is required to figure out how to satisfy the intention. If the content
of the intention matches an item in one’s repertoire of basic acts, and if the
conditions are right, the formation of the intention becomes sufficient for its
execution by the lower subsystems. …[K]nowing how to do something, B,
without needing to use one’s knowledge of how to do something, A, in order
to do B boils down to a capacity rational agents have of getting B done without
needing to cognitively control how it is done. (Enç 2003, 71)
[A]ll intentional bodily agency involves the interweaving of conscious systems
of bodily control with more basic, effectively automated or non-intentional
systems. When I type, for instance, although I may decide consciously which
words I shall use, I do not need to engage in any conscious supervision of my
fingers—they just get on with the job by themselves, as it were, now that I have
learned to type. (Steward 2009, 301)
As habit takes over, the movements of my fingers become automatic: they are
actions I perform, though not intentionally. This may sound odd, but not
if we cancel the implication that they are unintentional or involuntary; they
are merely “sub-intentional.” As my skills develop, what used to be non-basic
action—playing C sharp by moving my fingers thus and so—becomes basic,
something that I can simply do. I no longer have any idea how my fingers are
moving, except perhaps through memory, as I play the notes. Many of the
actions we perform have “sub-intentional” components, some of which have
never been intentional. (Setiya 2007, 55)
There are differences between these characterizations of the exercise of skill. Where
Setiya attributes the movements made in the course of performing a basic action
to the agent proper (“they are actions I perform”), Enç seems happy to suggest that
they are produced by “lower subsystems”; Steward takes an apparently intermedi-
ate position, ascribing them to the fingers “themselves, as it were.” I am interested,
however, in their considerable similarities—and in those similarities’ source. The
exercises of skill described here are not immediate: they unfold in time. And this
unfolding is not homogenous, but consists in the occurrence of movements of dif-
ferent sorts. However, the articulation within the basic action is not the work of the
agent’s intention or practical reasoning: the lowest level her intention reaches is to
tie her shoelace, type the words she has settled on, or play C sharp. The movements
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through which a basic action transpires are not themselves intentional actions—if
they are actions at all, they are (not un-, but) non- or sub-intentional.3 And the
agent does not consciously engage with them: she does not “cognitively control” or
“conscious[ly] supervis[e]” them; indeed, she may “no longer have any idea” what
is going on at this level of description, which has become “automatic”. To summa-
rize the common picture (in a way that no doubt oversimplifies these philosophers’
views), the capacities exercised in higher-order, complex, fully intentional, rational
agency are quite different from those that constitute the skills responsible for the exe-
cution and details of basic actions: the rational superstructure of intentional agency
is set upon a non- or sub-rational base of skill. I will call this the default view—and
argue that it cannot be maintained.4
My case against the default view develops argumentsmade byThompson (2008) and
Lavin (2013). Reflection on the spatio-temporal structure of action leadsThompson
to conjecture that every intentional action has an initial segment that is itself an in-
tentional action, performed by the agent in order to perform the whole (2008, 106–
12);5 if this is right, there cannot be basic actions, because every intentional action
will be performed by means of performing another. Developing this line of thought,
Lavin argues that the idea of an intentional action without internal means-end struc-
ture ultimately collapses: “[b]asic action is not action at all and has no place in an ac-
count of [intentional action]” (2013, 295). Thompson and Lavin deploy these argu-
ments against particular conceptions—causal theories, broadly speaking—of inten-
tional action. But it seems that their arguments prove too much: though the views
they target surely depend on the concept of basic action, it seems that so does any
account of intentional action. Therefore everyone, whether they endorse a causal
theory of action or not, has reason to try to rehabilitate some conception of basic
action. Those who have responded to Thompson and Lavin have tried to find fault
with their arguments.6 But this defensive strategy is, I think, misguided. It leaves
the real moral of their arguments untouched: thinking through what it means for
some happening to be a case of “action at all” reveals that the most fundamental
3Some (e.g. Wolfson 2016, 52) deny that they are actions; for reasons to reject this claim, see
Steward (2009).
4Though I reject the default view of basic action, I do not think an agent’s control of her basic
action in progress depends on her supervising ormonitoring it.
5Thompson states his conjecture in apparently weaker terms—“Acts of moving something some-
where intentionally always have an initial segment that is also an act ofmoving something somewhere
intentionally” (2008, 111)—but his discussion warrants the stronger formulation in the text (if it war-
rants either): see §2 below.
6See e.g. Bishop (2011); Setiya (2012); Hornsby (2013); Frost (2016); Wolfson (2016).
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and minimal requirements on an account of action—that the agent is its source or
originator, and that she relates to it as an agent, not an observer—cannot be met by
basic action unless some fundamental assumptions about the nature of skill and its
relationship to practical reason are given up.
It is, of course, a traditional thought that there is no deliberation about how to exer-
cise a skill,7 and thus that deliberation and skill exclude each other or are otherwise
opposed. But contemporary theorists overstate the difference between acting from
deliberation and acting from skill. This yields an inadequate conception of basic ac-
tion as alien to the conceptual order of which it is supposed to be the fundamental
member: if acting from deliberation and acting from skill have as little in common
as the default view contends, then it is unclear how both kinds of action could be
intentional, and consequently mysterious how one could do something intention-
ally by means of performing a basic action. This inadequacy is the other horn of the
dilemma any account of basic action must negotiate, the regress being the first. My
goals in this essay are to make a case that the dilemma is significant, and then to ar-
ticulate a conception of basic action—and thus of the nature of skill and its relation
to deliberation—that navigates it. My central thesis is that skill and basic action are
distinguished from deliberation and non-basic action not by virtue of the fact that
the former pair lack the means-end structure that essentially characterizes the latter
pair, but rather insofar as they exhibit that structure in a specifically different form.
Skill contrasts with deliberation—not because it is not a manifestation of practical
reason, but—because the two are specifically different manifestations of practical
reason.
I begin by making more precise the argument for why there must be basic action,
and explaining why this argument stops short of establishing the default view (§1).
In §§2–3 I explain why Thompson’s and Lavin’s arguments put real pressure on the
intelligibility of basic action. In §4 I develop my alternative.
1. practicable know-how and basic action
The view that “the pattern of practical reasoning…is the real source for the need to
introduce basic acts” (Enç 2003, 52) is widely held, though different philosophers
have formulated different regresses on its basis. Here is my preferred version. I en-
gage in practical reasoning, in the familiar sense at issue here, in order to figure out
7Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b1ff.
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how to dowhat I want to do—and to figure it outwith a view to doing it, not simply to
knowing how I could do it. Such reasoning implicates, at a minimum, beliefs—and
when all goes well, knowledge—about how things can be done.8 To be reasoning
that is genuinely practical—for it to issue in action (or an intention I can execute)—
this must be knowledge I can put into practice. But for my knowledge that (e.g.) one
can make a Gibson by mixing a Martini and then garnishing it with a cocktail onion
to be, as I’ll put it, practicable know-how, I must know how to mix a Martini—and
the latter know-how must be practicable, too. My knowledge that I can do C by do-
ing B can constitute practicable knowledge how to do C only if I also have practicable
knowledge of how to do B: knowledge of the form I can do C by doing B is, I’ll say,
practicable only derivatively. Of course, the practicability of my knowledge how to
do Cmight derive from practicable knowledge how to do B that has the same form—
knowledge that I can do B by doing A. But this too is knowledge that is practicable
only derivatively. The practicability of derivatively practicable know-how thus de-
pends on directly—i.e. non-derivatively—practicable know-how. The point is not
that it would be absurd to suppose that an agent needed (to possess, formulate, or
act on) infinitely many pieces of derivatively practicable know-how in order to do
anything (Hornsby 1980, 88). Whether or not that would be absurd, it wouldn’t
help: directly practicable know-how would still be needed. Without understanding
knowledge that can be put into practice directly (and what it is to do so), we have no
idea of what it is to put knowledge into practice at all. The conclusion of the argu-
ment is therefore that there must be basic (i.e. directly practicable) know-how; basic
action is understood in turn as the exercise or realization of basic know-how.9
The conceptions of basic know-how and of basic action (and thus of doing some-
thing directly or “just like that”) that this reflection yields are wholly negative and
schematic—basic actions “are, as it were, specified by logical erasure” (Danto 1979,
472). A basic action is one donewithout doing something else as ameans to doing it.10
One knows how to do such a thing otherwise than on the basis of knowing that one
can do it by means of doing something else. The relevant conception of basic action is,
as Hornsby puts it, “elicited by reference to the lack of a certain sort of knowledge”
(viz., knowledge of the form I can do B by doing A); nevertheless, “basic things would
8I will abstract from various interesting questions about non-fundamental cases that would dis-
tract fromour purposes (e.g., whether onemight do B intentionally bymeans of doingA if onemerely
believes that doing A is a way of doing B, etc.).
9For this form of argument (though with different terminology) see Hornsby (2005).
10Indeed, this characterization goes beyond what the regress establishes: though there must be
basic know-how, its exercises might nevertheless be teleologically complex. See §4 below.
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seem to be things that agents do know how to do” (2007, 174, first emphasis mine).11
Call this, then, the schematic view of basic know-how and basic action.
The schematic view clearly does not explain how intentional action is possible:
we cannot block the regress simply by introducing regress-stopping know-how
and regress-stopping action. Positive characterizations of basic know-how and
its exercise are needed. It is widely agreed that a plausible determinate view will
acknowledge that I may have both basic and non-basic knowledge how to do A,
so that whether my doing A on some occasion is a basic action or not depends on
which knowledge I exercised in doing A (e.g. I might raise my right arm “directly”,
or I might raise it “indirectly”—by lifting it withmy left). It is also widely agreed that
different agents may have different basic know-how from each other, and that their
“basic repertoires” may change over time. However, there is disagreement about
the objects of basic know-how—what kinds of action may be performed “directly”,
“just like that”. Some (e.g. Danto 1965; Davidson 1971; Smith 2012) hold that basic
actions are restricted to bodily movements—that what I have basic knowledge how
to do is raise my right arm, turn my head, clench my fist, etc.12 Others (e.g. Hornsby
1980, 2005; Enç 2003; Setiya 2007, 2008) hold that basic actions also include the
exercises of skills—that in addition to having basic knowledge how to raise my arm
or clench my fist, I (might) have basic knowledge how to tie my shoelaces, sign my
name, type the word ‘action’, play a C major scale on the piano, hit a top-spin tennis
forehand, etc. The default view evidently adopts the latter, more generous construal;
I will, too.13
The regress of practicable know-how shows that the schematic view must be true,
and therefore that we cannot understand the possibility of intentional actionwithout
a determinate account of basic know-how and basic action that adequately realizes
the schema. But is that possible?
11Hornsby takes great pains to tell us what basic know-how and its exercise are not: someone with
basic knowledge how to φ “is able to simply φ (at least so long as it is actually possible for her to φ)”
(2005, 115), but (1) this “does not assimilate [basic know-how] to abilities” (2005, 116 n.16); (2) the
things of which basic know-how is knowledge how to do “are not to be equated with the simple things
one is able to do” (2007, 173); (3) the abilities to do the things one is able to simply do are not by that
very fact simple abilities (2005, 126); and (4) we should not “confuse the idea that we are able to [e.g.]
simply voice our thoughts with the idea that voicing our thoughts is something that we simply do”
(2005, 126).
12Davidson (1971, 50–51) would say that a basic description of an action (e.g. a tying of my
shoelaces) would be a bodily movement description (i.e. a moving of my body in just the way required
to tie my shoelaces).
13Though see §4.2 below for discussion of the relation between skill and bodily movement.
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2. the initial segment argument
Thompson’s argument suggests not. Though philosophers of action often focus on
cases in which one might say, of a case in which I did B by doing A, that I performed
one action that can be described in twoways (e.g., my action can be described both as
a turning on of the light and as a flipping of the switch), Thompson draws attention to
cases in which doing A (e.g. breaking an egg) is a proper part of doing B (making an
omelette)—and thus couldn’t be identical with it. Thompson acknowledges that, in-
tuitively, the articulation of a complex course of intentional activity into “sub-actions
that are themselves clearly intentional…will come to a limit” (there are, intuitively,
no intentional sub-actions that stand as parts to writing the letter ‘a’ as writing the
letter ‘a’ stands to writing ‘action’); nevertheless, he argues that “[e]ven actions that,
like arm-raising, do not divide in this way need not… be viewed as pointlike” (2008,
106–7):
Let it be…that I have pushed a stone along a certain path from α to ω, and that
this is a completed intentional action of mine. It must also, of course, be that I
have pushed the stone from α to β, if β is a place about halfway along the path
fromα to ω. And as I began to push off fromα it would have been asmuch true
for me to say, “I am pushing it to β” as “I am pushing it to ω.” How, though,
can we deny the further claim that I was pushing the stone to β, the midpoint,
intentionally—just as, by hypothesis, I was pushing it to ω intentionally, and
along that path? … [I]t is hard to see why we shouldn’t say not just that I was
pushing the stone to β intentionally, but also that I was pushing, and pushed,
the stone to β because I was pushing it to ω. Why not? The push from α to β
might not be “salient”, of course, so it might be a bit odd, conversationally, to
point it out. But if it were as much of my operation as you could see, the rest
having been occluded by a curtain, you might legitimately attach the question
“Why?” to that description, and I, in turn, might legitimately offer a naive ra-
tionalization using the other [i.e. “I’m pushing it to β because I’m pushing it
to ω”]. But, now, every bodily movement that is intentional under what might
be called a “bodily movement description” takes a limb from one kinaesthet-
ically given position to another: why, then, shouldn’t we isolate some such
initial segment in every such case? (Thompson 2008, 107–8; cf. Lavin 2013,
276)
Consequently, Thompson claims, “[a]cts of moving something somewhere inten-
tionally always have an initial segment that is also an act of moving something some-
where intentionally” (2008, 111). In fact, his argument haswider application: assum-
9
basic action and practical knowledge Will Small
ing that waiting for a bus is something that may be done intentionally, if I waited for
the bus from noon until its scheduled arrival at 12:07, then at each point in time be-
tween noon and 12:07 I had waited from noon until then—and, by parity ofThomp-
son’s reasoning, waited until then intentionally, and because I was waiting for the
bus. In this case, the “continuousness” of my deed—the homogeneity of the de-
scriptions of my actions and the homoiomerity of those actions (Thompson 2008,
111)—derives from that of time rather than local motion.14 Thompson’s argument
would thus establish that the spatio-temporal “density” of intentional actions is in
fact teleological: every part, in the relevant sense, of an intentional action is itself an
intentional action performed for the sake of the whole, and every intentional action
has proper parts in the relevant sense. If this is right, then there cannot be basic
actions—“onlymore basic ones” (Frost 2016, 39).
But because the very intelligibility of intentional action seems to depend on the le-
gitimacy of some conception of basic action, many have sought to resist the initial
segment argument. Setiya objects that the agent didn’t push the stone to β inten-
tionally because he didn’t care whether he went through β or not: he goes through β
“only as a foreseen consequence” of what he intends to do, “not as the means to an
end” (2012, 289; cf. Bishop 2011, 215–6; Hornsby 2013, 11; Frost 2016, 42–43;Wolf-
son 2016, 57–58). Hornsby objects that the initial segment argument exploits “an
untenable conception of agential processes” (2013, 2); on her preferred conception,
“unbounded stretches of activity of arbitrary length”—such as Thompson’s pushing
the stone from α to β while pushing it to ω or my waiting for the bus from noon to
12:02 while waiting until 12:07—“are not particulars, and thus not actions” (11; cf.
Wolfson 2016, 57). Clearly an adequate understanding of intentional action must
include a proper account of the distinction between what is done intentionally and
what is brought about merely as a consequence, side-effect, or by-product;15 it must
also involve thinking through the distinctions and relations between the categories
event, process, action, and activity.16 Treating these topics, and thus properly evalu-
ating these responses to the initial segment argument, unfortunately lies beyond the
14Rödl (2002, §2); Small (2012, §6); and Lavin (2013, §5) note that temporality is the fundamental
ground of the initial segment argument. If this is right, then Setiya’s contention that the argument
“will not apply to intentional actions that do not involve movement, like staying still, or to most
instances of mental action” (2012, 288) misfires—it will apply to all those expressions of agency de-
scriptions of which “admit the ‘continuous tenses’ or the progressive” (Thompson 2008, 106).
15For discussion, see Hanser (1998, 2000).
16For discussion, see e.g. Stout (1997); Thompson (2008 ch. 8); Crowther (2011); Hornsby (2012,
2013); Steward (2012); and the essays in Stout (2018).
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scope of this paper.17 What we can evaluate, however, are the conceptions of basic
action that are supposedly made available by these responses to the initial segment
argument—for even if the responses are cogent (something I take no stand on here),
the conceptions may not be.
As we have seen, Setiya holds the default view. Hornsby does not. She aims to show
that Lavin’s andThompson’s “animadversions against the whole idea of basicness are
misplaced” by articulating a picture on which basic know-how consists in “knowing
how to be engaged in a certain activity, rather than how to participate in or to bring
about an event of a certain sort [i.e. an action]” (2013, 17):
Someone who lacked any interest in what Jones was intentionally doing [viz.
buttering toast], and was concerned only with the question how toast may be
buttered, […]might see [the episode] as one in which the knife in Jones’s hand
repeats movements in a certain series—first along the toast, then towards the
block of butter, …. They would discern a means–end structure which is not
articulated in any intention of Jones, and is absent from the ongoing activity
of Jones. Jones for his part was buttering toast for a bit, to do which he didn’t
have to do first one thing (intentionally), then another thing (intentionally),
then another. One might say that he exercised his skills in buttering the toast.
That would be a way to register the idea that someone who has the skill of φ-
ing, though she may φ thoughtfully, has no means–end knowledge how to φ.
(Hornsby 2013, 16–17)18
Like Hornsby, Frost suggests that what is basic is ultimately not an action (e.g. my
walking fromA to B) but the activity (i.e. walking) that constitutes it. Basic activity is
not intentional but rather “thoughtful”; and he too holds that such activities should
“be thought of as exercises of skills or capacities” (2016, 49). The explanation of the
details of the movements that transpire as the agent engages in basic activity will, he
says, “appeal to her skills and habitual ways of moving rather than to her particular
17But see §4.1 below on the idea that pushing the stone to β is merely a foreseen consequence of
pushing it to ω.
18Hornsby (2012, 2013) holds that an action (an event) is ascribed to an agent in a sentence that has
past tense and perfective aspect (“N.N. walked to the store”), whereas activity (process) is ascribed
to an agent in sentences with progressive aspect (“N.N. is/was walking to the store”). While N.N.
was walking to the store, he had not yet walked to the store, so there was not yet an action that was
his walking to the store (on that occasion); there was instead only some (then) “ongoing activity” in
which he was engaged—some walking store-wards. Thus for Hornsby, “action” and “event” are count
nouns, whereas “activity” and “process” aremass nouns. (Frost (2016, 47) draws the contrast between
action and activity slightly differently.)
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intentions” (2016, 44). Though he doesn’t exploit a distinction between action and
activity, Wolfsonmakes an otherwise similar proposal: basic actions are exercises of
an agent’s “second-natural capacities,” which are “products of our rational nature”
despite not being structured by means-end rationality. The exercises of these capac-
ities therefore “will not have the complexity characteristic of taking means” (2016,
56): “there is no articulation in the action” (61).
By insisting that exercises of basic agential capacities are thoughtful and ra-
tional—and thus, presumably, not mindless, automatic, or beyond the agent’s
control—Hornsby, Frost, and Wolfson presumably mean to distinguish their
conceptions of basic action (or activity) from the default view, even though
the means-end structure that articulates the thoughtfulness and rationality of
non-basic action is absent from it. I am unconvinced that these conceptions
constitute progress: either by “skill”, “second-natural capacity”, etc. these authors
ultimately mean nothing more than the schematic view does by “basic know-how”
(i.e. regress-stopping know-how), or the absence of any rational structure for the
agent in the unfolding of the basic action (in her being engaged in ongoing basic
activity) means that these are but variations on the default view. But what is the
problem with the default view?
3. agency and practical knowledge
As I explained above, whether the initial segment argument is probative depends
on how we resolve difficult questions concerning the distinction(s) between inten-
tional actions and their (foreseen, foreseeable) consequences, side-effects, and by-
products, and the distinctions and relations between event, process, action, and ac-
tivity. In my view, however, the argument is significant regardless: not, indeed, as
a proof of the impossibility of basic action, but insofar as it draws attention to the
teleological articulation of intentional action and its centrality to our understanding
of rational agency. Reflection on this articulation and its significance should lead us
to reject the default view—regardless of whether the initial segment argument itself
can be blocked.
The fundamental idea of action is the idea of some change (broadly construed) of
which the agent is the source or originator; and it is the idea of a change that the
subject relates to not as an observer or spectator but—as agent. As a useful short-
hand for these two ideas, I will say that the primary manifestations of rational and
intentional human agency are, as such, from and for their agents. It may seem to
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some that there could be nothing more to “relating to an event/process as its agent”
than being its originator: nothing more to an action’s being for the agent than its
being from her. But consider a case in which by slamming your hand down on the
table, you cause the first domino to fall—andwatch in horror as the whole rally takes
place. You knocked down the dominos (albeit unintentionally). And you stood in
the same observational or spectatorial relation to the domino rally as did your (dis-
mayed) friend who had spent all morning setting it up. But attributions of agency in
cases like this depend on more fundamental ones—the reason we say you knocked
the dominos down is that you did something (slammed your hand down on the ta-
ble) that caused, in a reasonably direct way, a series of events that can thereby be
imputed to you as agent (Davidson 1971). However, you didn’t stand in the specta-
torial relation to the precipitous slam. Different theories draw the line betweenwhat
I really do andwhat happens as an effect of what I really do but which can nevertheless
be imputed to me as my deed in different places—perhaps all I “really” do is intend
or try to do something (Hornsby 1980); perhaps I “really” move my body but the
rest is up to nature (Davidson 1971); or perhaps I “really” do whatever I do inten-
tionally (Ford 2018b)—but all hold that I relate to “what I really do” as agent, not
as spectator. The claims that agents are sources of their actions and that they relate
to what they are “really” doing not as observers but as agents—that actions are from
and for their agents—belong to no theory of action; they outline the topic of which
any such theory is a theory.19 Theproblem is that the way the default view represents
a basic action’s being from the agent precludes its being for the agent—hence Lavin’s
complaint that “ ‘basic action’ seems not to be action at all” (2013, 293).
I will show this by first sketching an account of what is involved in an agent’s relating
to an action as agent, or her action’s being for her, in the unproblematic case of ordi-
nary non-basic intentional action. Once we have drawn out the ways in which this
fundamental mark of agency depends on action’s being inscribed with the pattern
of practical reasoning, it will be comparatively easy to see that basic action—as con-
strued by the default view—cannot be intentional action. Of course, if a basic action
is not an intentional action, it cannot be that by means of which an agent does some-
thing non-basic—in which case the default view doesn’t instantiate the schematic
view or speak to the regress.
Consider, then, a case of non-basic intentional action. My goal is to do D, and I’m
doing it, right now, by doing C, having already done A and B. The end for the sake
19As Velleman (2007, xii) notes, the idea that “being a spectator is the diametrical opposite of
being an agent…is almost universal in the philosophical literature about action and the will”; cf. the
extensive list of quotations in his fn.3.
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of which I’m currently doing C (namely, D) determines, at least in part, what counts
as doing C on this occasion—what counts as doing it badly or well (enough), what
counts as having finished. I’m keeping track of, or at least am sensitive to, how well
things are going with my C-ing in the light of my end: depending on how things
are going, I may modify the way in which I’m doing C, or try C-ing again, or do
something else as well or instead (so long as I still think my end worth pursuing).
This is so even ifmyC-ing is going perfectly well considered “in itself ”—quawalking
to the department it’s going just fine (I’m not stumbling erratically, or walking in the
wrong direction), but qua walking to the department in order to get to the meeting it’s
not (I need stop walking and start running if I’m to get there on time). We might
say, to use some popular terminology, that my intention to do D guides my doing
C—but what that means is just that I am aware that and how doing C contributes to
doing D, and I am adjusting what I’m doing to that end.20
That everything that has gone on and is going on amounts to my being in the pro-
cess of doing D intentionally depends on my practical thought: my plan to do D by
means of doing A and B and then doing C.21 If I had done A and B and were now
doing C but had never thought of doing all of them in order to do D, then I wouldn’t
be doing D intentionally. So my practical thought is responsible for the reality and
specific shape of my doing D intentionally: I am its source or originator. And the
same practical thought provides for my awareness that I am doing D intentionally:
I know that I did A and B, and am now doing C, because I’m doing D. My practical
thought about how to do D is at once the source of the reality of my doing D inten-
20This should not be understood as requiring the agent tomonitor her ongoing action or consciously
oversee her intention’s guidance of it. That would over-intellectualize the account. However, what
guides action must be identified with the agent herself, and not merely a system located within her
(Frankfurt 1978, 73–75). It is therefore plausible to ascribe to the agent the awareness of how the
means are contributing to the end that is internal to the guidance, by the intention to perform the
end by taking the means, of the execution of those means. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
encouraging this clarification.
21I use the generic expression “practical thought” to remain neutral on questions concerning ex-
actly what sort ofmental states, attitudes, episodes, and activities it comprises. Inmy sense, “practical
thought” covers those thoughts, and thinkings of them, that are directed at doing things. Thus in-
tention and practical reasoning would be paradigm cases of practical thought. Some may think that
a means-end belief (e.g. that I can do D by doing C) on “active duty” is a case of practical thought,
whereas others may deem it theoretical thought in the service of practice—in which case its content
may be taken up by practical thought in the intention to do C in order to do D; similar questions may
arise concerning the status of desire. Practical thought needn’t take the form of occurrent reasoning
or deliberation: it may take the form of a standing policy that is in play. But the means-end “pattern”
(“order”, etc.) will be the same.
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tionally and my knowledge that I am doing D—it is not as if my practical thought
provides merely for the reality of my doing D intentionally, leavingme in the dark as
to whether I am doing it (so that I would have to observe or infer that I’m doing what
I intend to be doing). My knowledge that I am doing D is thus practical knowledge
in Anscombe’s sense: it is “non-observational” knowledge that is “the cause of what
it understands” (1963, §48), and its source is means-end practical reasoning (§33).
(Anscombe claims that practical knowledge, in this sense, is a necessary condition of
intentional action, but this controversial claim is not needed here. Many think the
necessity claim must be rejected because of examples like Davidson’s carbon copier
(1971, 50), whowas trying—successfully, as it happened—tomake ten carbon copies
at once by writing firmly on the top sheet, despite lacking any confidence—and thus
not even believing, let alone knowing—that he was doing so in fact. But Davidson’s
carbon copier was trying—and, though he didn’t believe it, succeeding—to do one
thing [make ten copies] by means of doing another [writing firmly on the top sheet].
The sceptical doubt applies to the [more] complex action, rather than the [more]
basic one: the copier may have doubted that he was making all ten copies in one
go, but he was aware that he was pressing firmly on the top sheet. Such examples
lend no support to the idea that agents could be systematically unaware that that
they were performing the intentional actions they intend to be performing. In fact,
theymight show instead that onemay do B intentionally while lacking Anscombean
practical knowledge that one is doing B only if one is doing B by doing A, where one
has Anscombean practical knowledge that one is doing A.22 For this reason, I say
that Anscombean practical knowledge is a necessary condition—not of intentional
action tout court, but—of core cases of intentional action: those on which the non-
core cases depend. Basic actions will evidently be paradigm core cases of intentional
action.23)
22Some (e.g. Harman 1976) hold that ethical considerations may determine that an agent did A
intentionally, even if she lacked practical knowledge that she was doing A, because doing A was a
foreseen or foreseeable consequence of something else she did intentionally (and of which we have
no reason to doubt that she had practical knowledge). Non-core cases of intentional action may be
done by means of or simply by performing core cases of intentional action.
23Setiya (2008, 389–90) claims that practical knowledge is not a necessary condition of basic
action—and thus, in my terms, that not every case of basic action is a core case of intentional action.
His reason is an example of a recently paralyzed subject who tries, successfully, to clench his fist “just
like that” (a basic action) despite lacking any confidence (or justification for it) in success. We might
doubt that the subject clenched his fist intentionally. But even if we accept the example, it provides
no reason for thinking that agents could be systematically unaware that they are performing the basic
actions they intend to be performing—that lack of awareness could be the rule, rather than the excep-
tion. For the case is precisely described as exceptional: Setiya’s subject has suffered an interruption
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The teleological unity of a non-basic action (just discussed) is the source of the ac-
tion’s temporal unity. If I did D intentionally, then there was a time, after I’d begun
but before I’d finished, at which I was doing D.That I was doing D doesn’t entail that
I did (or would or will) doD: someone can have been crossing the street even though
she never crossed the street. Accidents happen. But accidents are accidents—they
are accidental to what was anyway happening. A special explanation is required if,
in a particular case, someone was doing something but didn’t end up having done it.
By contrast, no special explanation is required if an agent ends up having done what
she was in fact doing.24 Thus any account of agency must explain these two aspects
of the temporal unity of action:
(1) What makes it the case that it will be no accident if I end up having done D
intentionally (which it must be if I am actually doing D intentionally, and not
merely e.g. trying to do D)?
(2) What makes it the case that in having done whatever I have done so far in
order to do D (A, B, and some of C),25 it’s true that I am doing D? (After all,
the steps towards doing D I have already taken might be just the same as the
opening steps of doing E, and yet I am doing D, not E—even if, as it turns out,
I don’t end up having done D because something interferes or I change my
mind.)
in the ordinary functioning of the relevant practical capacity (to clench his fist) and the case occurs
during the interval in which his capacity is functioning again, though he doesn’t know that it is. It is
surely not credible—on pain of severing the hard to articulate yet fundamental connection between
agency and control or the absence of luck—to suppose that our basic practical capacities could oper-
ate despite our lacking an awareness of their exercises in general; and if the relevant awareness were
merely observational, we would not relate to those exercises as agents. If the subject’s clenching of his
fist is an intentional action, it is a basic action though not a core case of action (not because it is per-
formed by doing something that is a core case—which would make it non-basic—but rather because
it is a non-standard exercise of a basic practical capacity the ordinary functioning of which provides
for an awareness of its exercises). Conceding that there might be occasions on which—because the
conditions for the exercise of the relevant practical capacities are not propitious—an agent might per-
form a basic action without knowing that she was doing so undermines the claim that basic actions
are paradigm core cases of intentional action no more than acknowledging the existence of albino
ravens undermines the claim that ravens are black.
24See Rödl (2012 chs. 5–6); Small (2012, §4); Wolfson (2012) for elaboration.
25An “activity theorist” such as Hornsbymight object to talk of “what I have already done” in that I
am already doing something, insofar as it attributes actual particularity to what is merely potentially
particular, “an” undetached “stretch of activity”. But all that I am appealing to here is the “concreteness
of actions (of ‘tokens’)” that “someone’s engagement in an activity…partakes of ” (Hornsby 2013, 3).
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It seems obvious that the answer to (2) is given by intention: what makes it the case
that, in doing what I’m doing, I’m doing D (not E, or whatever) is that I am doing it
in execution of my intention to do D. But the intention to do D can’t explain why, in
doing what I’m doing, it will be no accident if I end up having done D—at least, it
can’t if (as many think) it is merely inadvisable or irrational, though not impossible,
to intend to do something one doesn’t know how to do. It will be no accident that
my doing what I’m doing ends up with my having done D intentionally only if I
both intend and know how to do D (and I’m exercising that knowledge)—after all, it
would be some accident, in the relevant sense, if I succeeded in doing D by acting on
beliefs about how to do D that were false or merely accidentally true, or if I had no
idea about how to do D. Of course, in the case of non-basic action, my knowledge
how to do D is non-basic know-how: knowledge that I can do D by doing A and
B, and then C. This means-end knowledge constitutes the pattern of my practical
thought. In conceiving of myself as doing D by means of doing A and B and then
doing C, I represent these means as sufficient (or as part of a larger sufficient plan)
for doing D; I thereby think it would be some accident if doing what is (as I see it)
sufficient for doing D did not suffice for ending up having done D.26 My practical
thought thus provides for both the reality and my awareness of the temporal unity
of my action—of the fact that, in doing what I’m doing, I’m doing D intentionally,
and that it’ll be no accident if I succeed. Because it ismy practical thought that is the
source of the fact that I’m actually doing D, what’s happening is fromme; because it
is my practical thought through which I’m aware that I’m doing D, it is forme—that
is, my awareness of the unfolding process is that of an agent, rather than that of a
spectator.
The previous four paragraphs provided an exposition of the teleological and tempo-
ral unity of a core case of non-basic intentional action to show that and how an agent
is “in touch with” the progress of her deed. The problem is that, as the default view
characterizes the exercise of basic know-how, the agent cannot be in touch with it in
the right way.27
Basic actions, the default view allows, are temporally extended: it takes time to raise
your arm, clench your fist, type a word, tie your shoelaces, make a left turn on skis,
etc. Thus if an agent performs a basic action, there will have been a time at which she
26A completely sufficient and determinate plan isn’t required at the start: it can be filled in as I go
along. Of course, a plan to do D by doing A and then figuring out what to do next, may, if reasonable,
be viewed as a kind of sufficient plan.
27I fear this must be true of the views of Hornsby, Frost, and Wolfson, too, as the formulations in
the next paragraph in the text suggest.
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was performing it—she had begun but not finished (e.g.) tying her shoelaces. From
some perspective, that she is tying her shoelaces consists in various movements that
have taken place and are taking place with her fingers, wrists, and other parts of her
body (and the laces). From some perspective—but not fromher perspective as agent.
From her point of view, the action has no articulation. For, according to propo-
nents of the default view, the details of the realization of an act-type belonging to an
agent’s basic repertoire are “not controlled by the centers that control such units [of
behaviour]” (Enç 2003, 61); her (e.g.) fingers “just get on with the job by themselves”
(Steward 2009, 301); she “no longer [has] any idea how [her] fingers are moving, ex-
cept perhaps through memory” (Setiya 2007, 55). If the agent has any idea of the
details of her movement, in performing a basic action, it will be through perception
or memory—forms of awareness that, unlike practical knowledge in Anscombe’s
sense, are independent of their objects. If she is aware of them, the agent confronts
these details as a reality that is independent of her practical thought—she relates to
them as observer, not as agent.
Of course, there are details and there are details. Many of the details of a course of
intentional activity will lie, perfectly innocuously, outside the agent’s rational con-
trol, andmany descriptions of such a course of activity (including, but not restricted
to, descriptions that make such details salient) are descriptions under which it will
not be intentional. But some of the detailsmatter instrumentally: not just any move-
ments of an agent’s fingers can constitute her (e.g.) tying her shoelaces. The teleo-
logically significant details or aspects of basic action are the ones at issue here. And
according to the default view, these details—the movements in which the basic ac-
tion’s unfolding consists—are not for the agent. They are not intentional actions; nor
do they figure in either the agent’s standing know-how or her intention to exercise
it here and now.
Because the teleologically significant details are not for the agent, neither is the ba-
sic action as a whole. This is because the agent is not responsible for its temporal
unity. The default view has an account of the temporal unity of basic action, but
the explanans lies outside the agent’s practical thought: while the basic action is
unfolding—while it is true that the agent is tying her shoelaces, say—what makes
it the case that she is actually tying her shoelaces (that it will be no accident if what’s
happening here and now ends up with her shoelaces getting tied) is a general pattern
in a subsystem, her fingers, etc. As her practical thought does not account for the
basic action’s temporal unity, the agent can (as such) at most be aware that she in-
tends to tie her shoelaces: she cannot (qua agent) be aware that she is tying them. The
truth of the progressive thought requiresmore than amere trigger, but that is all that
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the agent’s intention to perform the basic action could be. In particular, an inten-
tion to perform a basic action cannot “guide” the unfolding of the basic action that
executes it, because—by hypothesis—the intention has no means-end articulation
in its content, and thus it carries no information with which to guide the unfolding
basic action. If the agent’s practical thought figures merely as a trigger, any progres-
sive awareness the agent might have is not qua agent—her basic action is not for her.
Therefore the way the default view represents a basic action’s being from the agent
would seem to preclude its being for the agent.28
To be a core case of intentional action, a basic action would have to be from and for
the agent.29 To be from and for the agent, an action must be constituted by practical
thought. However, we have but one way of understanding how this is possible—
namely, through the exercise of teleologically structured (i.e. non-basic) know-how.
But to be a basic action, an action cannot be the exercise of non-basic know-how;
it must be the exercise of basic know-how. These thoughts are inconsistent, and as
far as I can see the default view lacks the resources to resolve the contradiction. The
appeals by Hornsby and others to the idea that basic action (or activity) consists
in thoughtfully exercising skills and capacities, made while they deny that these
thoughtful exercises are teleologically articulated from and for the agent, seem at
best to give names (“skill”, “thoughtful exercise”) to what we still do not understand.
The apparently innocuous and incontrovertible ideas with which we began—that de-
liberation must come to an end, that there must be things we can do “just like that”,
that not all know-how can be derivatively practicable—lead, seemingly inexorably,
to a picture of the exercise of skill as action from which the agent is necessarily es-
tranged, as Lavin points out (2013, 22).30 While the agent is doing A “directly”, the
teleologically significant details of the movements that go into her doing A are alien
28To be clear, my contention is that the default view’s conception of an agent’s practical thought
does not provide for awareness of the details of the teleologically significant movements that con-
stitute her basic action, and that lack of practical awareness of these movements (in form either of
ignorance or mere theoretical awareness) is incompatible with the basic action’s being for her. I have
not tried to argue that it would be impossible to develop the default view in order to account for basic
action’s being for the agent; my argument is intended as a request for an account, not as a proof that
none can be provided. Nevertheless, I think this is sufficient motivation to pursue a non-default view
of basic action (§4 below). Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.
29A non-core case of intentional action will (characteristically, though see n.23 above) be from the
agent by virtue of being performed by doing something that is a core case of intentional action, but
it will not be for the agent.
30There is no problem with supposing that we are sometimes estranged from our (basic) actions;
what is problematic is the idea that estrangement flows from the nature of (basic) action.
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to her practical thought. They are not rationally constrained by her understanding
that inmaking them she is doing A as ameans to doing B; they are just as they would
be if she were doing A as a means to something else. The character of the A-ing that
she gets done will be determined “from below”—not by practical thought and ratio-
nality, but rather, and in contrast, by skill. In fact, Lavin understates the problem:
the extrusion of practically rational structure from basic action threatens the idea
of practically rational structure in intentional action tout court. If the agent’s un-
derstanding that she is doing what she’s doing in order to do B does not permeate
the teleologically significant movements that go into her doing A, then her doing
A will not be rationally governed and constrained by her intention to do B. But if
she is doing B by means of doing A, yet her doing A is not rationally governed and
constrained by her intention to do B, then her doing B (insofar as it consists in her
doing A) is not rationally governed and constrained by her intention to do B. And
if her doing B is not rationally governed and constrained by her intention to do B,
how can it be a proper exemplification of the concept of intentional action?31 If the
intentionality of the basic actions by means of doing which the agent performs a
non-basic action is undermined (because the basic actions are determined from be-
low), then the intentionality of the non-basic action must be undermined—because
it is determined from below as well. Neither basic action, nor action based on basic
action, is action at all. And so as the default view turns out to conceive of it, basic
action is not regress-stopping action after all.
I confess that I cannot see how the default viewmight be amended so that itmeets the
challenges raise in this section; but whether it can be or not, it is worth considering
whether there is another way of halting the regress.
4. the teleological structure(s) of basic action
We face a dilemma. On the one hand, we cannot make sense of the practicability of
non-basic know-how, and thus the very idea of non-basic intentional action, unless
we canmake sense of basic—directly practicable—know-how and its direct exercise,
basic action. On the other hand, we cannot make sense of an intentional action the
unfolding of which is not from and for the agent; yet the only understanding we have
31Recall that many of the details of intentional action (basic and non-basic) will innocuously lie
beyond rational control. But a paradigm of rational control is the control that the end exerts over
themeans in a case of complex intentional action, and that is what goes missing when basic action is
construed as a sort of “prefab” element in the architecture of rational agency.
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of how action-in-progress can be from and for the agent appeals to a constitutive role
for means-end articulated practical thought (i.e. the deployment of non-basic know-
how)—something that a basic action must necessarily lack. Or must it? The regress
argument I endorsed in §1 above concludes that there must be directly practicable
know-how. To the extent that it shows the necessity of basic action, basic action
is defined solely as the exercise of non-derivatively practicable know-how. It does
not follow that exercises of basic know-how must be teleologically-unstructured ac-
tions.32 That would follow only if non-basic know-how is the only possible source
of teleological structure in action. This is something that is clearly widely assumed.
But is it true?
According to Lavin, it is not. Although he argues that basic action—in the sense
of action “barren of means-end structure” (2013, 274)—is not action at all, he ac-
cepts that there must be basic know-how—and thus that there must be basic action
in the sense that is defined solely as the exercise of basic know-how. Despite the pre-
dominant rhetoric of his paper, Lavin aims to legitimate a conception of practical
“basicness.” To avoid terminological confusion, I will henceforth use the term “basic
action” to mean the exercise of basic know-how (i.e. that which the regress demands
we make sense of) and “simple action” to mean a teleologically-unstructured action
(i.e. that which I rejected in §3). By drawing this distinction, we open the possibil-
ity of avoiding both horns of our dilemma.33 Of course, it is one thing to say that
the exercise of basic know-how is teleologically-structured action and another to ex-
plain how this can be: to explain the source and character of this structure, in a way
that does not undermine basic action’s status as action. Lavin offers an interesting
sketch, but as instructive as it is (and it is surely not intended as the whole story), I
will argue that is inadequate as it stands (§4.1): an adequate account requires a more
thoroughgoing rejection of the simplicity of skill and its exercise (§4.2).
32See n.10 above.
33In the discussion of action in which his initial segment argument occurs, Thompson explicitly
brackets questions concerning “what might be called the intellectual aspect of rationalization” (2008,
93), which would include questions concerning the relationship between basic and non-basic know-
how. Thus, though his argument aims to show that there are no simple actions, it leaves open the
question whether there are basic actions (i.e. whether there is know-how that can be put into practice
directly). I am grateful to Matthias Haase for discussion of this point.
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4.1. Simple skills and their spatiotemporally structured exercise
Basic know-how, Lavin says, “can be exercised in particular actions structured by
means-end reason. Indeed, my own view is that itmust be” (2013, 286). His thought
is that the practicable know-how regress shows that there must be “simple skills”
(284). If I have a simple skill of doing A, “it might be that I do not know any general
procedure for [doingA], but that nevertheless, when I [doA] onparticular occasions,
I perform these actions by knowingly taking particularmeans” (286, my emphases).
If my simple skill is walking, I do not just walk, I walk from here to there, and in
doing so I walk around this obstacle, etc. These “particular means” are particular
to this deployment of my simple skill and make reference to the particulars in its
material circumstances. They do not, however, introduce action-types other than
walking, by means of which I walk (e.g. bend my left knee, etc.); instead they specify
the generic act-type walking:
any performance manifesting [basic know-how] must involve drawing on
knowledge of particular means in the course of realizing an end. This
means-end order is not contained in the action concept itself, but in material
circumstances in which such a concept is exercised. … When making a left
turn skiing, one does not simply go left in an indivisible instant and one does
not merely make generic leftward movement. One has to, and, knows one
has to, turn left somewhere and somehow—turning left is not something that
can be realized simply per se. Making the turn takes time and essentially
involves a course of leftward movement: one is already moving downhill and
faced with an array of possible trajectories, some more or less steep, more or
less dangerous, and when turning left one charts a course leftward, as it were,
ordering one’s movement in a certain definite way. (Lavin 2013, 287)
According to Lavin, basic know-howhas no teleological structure (it is a simple skill):
the means-end order that the agent inscribes in its exercise “is not contained in the
action concept itself, but in material circumstances” in which that concept is real-
ized. The simplest—or purest—version of this derives from the fact that “a subject
whomoves self-consciously through space, or does things that take time, grasps [the
continuous magnitudes of space and time] at least intuitively” (2013, 287). It thus
belongs to the self-understanding of an agent who is pushing a stone from α to ω
that she must push it “the entire continuous distance,” and thus that she must push
it “halfway there, and halfway to halfway there, and so on. …[T]his sort of under-
standing supplies a basis for the unlimitedness of rational teleology” (287).
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The idea that an agent’s spatiotemporal surroundings and their contents need to
figure in an account of the means-end structure of an unfolding exercise of skill is
important. The specific way in which I exercise basic know-how on an occasion will
depend on the contingencies of the case. The exact shape my hand takes and the
degree of tension in my grip will be conditioned by the shape, weight, etc., of the
apple I’m picking up, and this is something that I am aware of, though of course my
awareness is an apple-involving one: I certainly couldn’t specify the details except
by reference to the apple and my grasp of it; they are not contained in my general
knowledge how to grasp things. Lavin here provides an important insight into the
exercise of skill—one that I endorse—but it is not self-standing, for it occurs in the
context of an inadequate conception of that which is thusly exercised; as a result, it
doesn’t underwrite the “unlimitedness of rational teleology.”
To see this, consider again the objection made by Setiya (and others) to the initial
segment argument: the agent didn’t care whether he pushed the stone through β
while pushing it from α to ω, so he didn’t push it to β intentionally. Obviously, the
specification of β matters: actions are intentional under descriptions. Perhaps β is
the spot where N.N. died. The argument doesn’t aim to show that the agent pushed
the stone to the spot where N.N. died intentionally—he might not have known that
that’s where N.N. died; even if he did, he might have been “practically indifferent”
(Frost 2016, 42) to it. For the claim that the agent pushed the stone from α to β in-
tentionally to be plausible, the specification of β must be one that is internal to the
project of pushing the stone fromα toω: e.g., themidpoint of the path α—ω.34 Having
made clear that the description of the purportedly intentional action of pushing the
stone from α to β is wholly internal—and thus brings no content of its own—to the
description of the action ofwhich it is a part, we see that the (allegedly) teleologically-
articulated task pushing the stone from α to ω by pushing it from α to β is more per-
spicuously notated not as doing B by doing A but as doing B by doing B*. Here the
34Mightn’t the agent be “practically indifferent” to pushing the stone to the midpoint of that path?
What does it matter whether he went to ω via β rather than a nearby point either side? Why should he
care that, as it happened, he went via β? Only an improbable project (of pushing the stone in a dead
straight line from α to ω) or improbable circumstances (a shoulder-width canyon running between
α and ω) would demand pushing the stone through β to push it from α to ω. —These reflections are
irrelevant, as the purely temporal case shows: when I waited for the bus from noon to 12:07, there
wasn’t some other time, slightly to the left or right of 12:02, until which I could have waited in order to
wait for the bus. Moreover, there’s something disquieting about writing off the agent’s determination
of his path through space and time as an unintended side-effect or by-product of acting, like the noise
produced by firing a gun: there couldn’t be anything analogous to a silencer that would enable me to
walk from α to ω without crossing any lines perpendicular to α—ω at determinate points.
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asterisk indicates that the content of do B*, though different from the content of do
B (as do A is), depends wholly on the content of B (as do A does not). It is one thing
to know that I can make an omelette (do Z) by first breaking an egg (doing A) and
then doing some other things (doing B, C, D…); it is another thing to know that I
can make an omelette by carrying out some of the process of making an omelette
(doing Z*) and then the rest (doing Z**, Z***, Z****…): the former is a piece of non-
basic know-how that someone who didn’t already know how to make an omelette
could find useful, whereas the latter is not—it amounts to saying that one can do Z
by doing Z, which no one could find useful.35 But if no one could find it useful, how
could it underwrite the idea that by exercising such knowledge I am takingmeans?36
What makes “I can do B by doing B*” useful, on Lavin’s view, is located not in my
generic knowledge how to do B, but in the material circumstances in which I am
doing B: I can walk from here to there by walking from here around that tree
to there. But now that we see what the view comes to, we can see that it is not
self-standing. We may illustrate the reason why by asking: what is the difference
between exercising one simple skill rather than another? What is the difference—for
the agent—betweenwalking fromhere to there, running fromhere to there, and
skiing from here to there? By hypothesis, these are simple skills, things the agent
has no means-end knowledge of how to do. The knowledge of “particular means”
that I at once acquire and exercise inmanifesting a simple skill on an occasion, which
accounts for my basic action’s permeation bymeans-end structure, has what content
it has for me by virtue of its reference to the particular places, times, objects (etc.)
through, during, on, around (etc.) which I act: but the generic action concept that
this particular content specifies is, for me, contentless.37
Of course, it’s not true that, for me, there is no difference between my basic knowl-
edge how towalk andmy basic knowledge how to play aCmajor scale on the piano—
or that the differences are exhausted by their distinctive whethers and whences. But
this is because it’s not true that I lack means-end knowledge how to do these things:
35Such “knowledge” makes explicit an aspect of the formal concept of movement (kinesis) that is
always in play in the idea of doing something (cf. Rödl 2011, §1.1); it remains empty until content is
supplied by themovement’s material circumstances. LikeThompson, Lavin assumes that every phase
of a movement is, as such, a part of it (in the relevant sense of “part”); for criticism, see Ford (2018a).
36Cf. Wolfson (2016, 59); Frost (2016, 46).
37This objection does not presuppose that there cannot be simple representations, or that it is never
possible to distinguish between them. Russellian acquaintance would be an example. But acquain-
tance depends on an object of acquaintance; differences in given objects can account for differences
in content. In the case of practical know-how, however, there is no given object: the knowledge
produces its object.
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it is not true that these—or, I hazard, any—skills are simple. The assumption that
ran throughout §§1–3 was that unless an action manifests knowledge of the form
I can do B by doing A, it must lack teleological structure. We have since seen that
basic action (action that is the exercise of basic know-how) needn’t be simple ac-
tion (action that is—for the agent—teleologically unarticulated). The assumption
that persists in Lavin’s attempt to draw this distinction is that basic know-how (non-
derivatively practicable know-how) must be simple know-how (know-how that is—
for the agent—teleologically unarticulated). The assumption is that what contrasts
with, and makes possible, “complex” know-how (of the form I can do B by doing A)
must be know-how that lacks means-end complexity. This assumption should be
rejected: it ignores the possibility that basic know-how might exhibit an alternative
form of that complexity, an outline of which I will now sketch.
4.2. Analytic and constitutive unities of acts
When someone has non-basic knowledge how to do B, the concept ‘do B’ denotes
an analytic unity of acts. This means that the various types of action, of which she
knows that she can do B by realizing them, can be realized independently of doing
B, and that the concepts of the sub-actions can be understood independently of the
concept of doing B. I know how to make a cheese and pickle sandwich: (1) butter
two slices of bread; (2) cut some cheese; (3) spread pickle on one slice; (4) place
the cheese on top of it; (5) turn the second slice over and put it on top of the first.
Each of these steps is something that can be done independently of the others, and
independently of making a cheese and pickle sandwich; and what it is to do each of
these things does not depend on what it is to make a cheese and pickle sandwich.
By contrast, when someone has basic knowledge how to do A, the concept ‘do A’
denotes a constitutive unity of acts: the various types of action that figure as means
in her knowledge how to do A are not independent of the unity in which they figure.
AndreaKern, fromwhom I borrow this terminology,makes the point by considering
short parallel turns on skis. According to the Ski-Lehrplan of theDeutscher Verband
für das Skilehrwesen:
The turn begins with an explosive extension of the legs in which one firmly
supports oneself on the downhill pole. Assume the traversing stance. Then
rapidly pull the skis upward. (One may experience some heel-tap.) At almost
the same time, one then swings one’s legs—but not one’s hips—quickly in the
direction of the turn. As one begins the turn, immediately increase the pres-
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sure on the outer ski and turn one’s outer leg in preparation. One’s rump will
be leaned distinctly over the outer ski […]. (Quoted in Kern 2017, 146)
Kern comments: “We cannot understand what an ‘explosive extension of the legs’
is, what it means to ‘firmly support oneself on the downhill pole’, and what it means
for one to ‘assume the traversing stance’ except insofar as we grasp these concepts
in relation to the totality of concepts that collectively provide a description of how
to ski parallel short turns” (2017, 147). Getting a practical understanding of any of
these concepts cannot occur independently of getting a practical grip on the concept
of a short parallel turn—that is, of developing the capacity to execute a short parallel
turn.38 Similarly, I know that I walk bymeans ofmovingmy legs (and, usually, arms),
though I cannot give an informative, independent specification of the relevant types
of movement—they are all indexed to walking. (We might say that I walk by means
of movingwalking my legs. I can do B by doing AdoingB should be contrasted with both I
can do B by doing A and I can do B by doing B*.)
Practical reason is manifested both in exercising analytical (non-basic) know-how
and in exercising constitutive (basic) know-how, but these exercises manifest it in
specifically different ways. A piece of analytical know-how—knowledge that I can
do B by means of doing A—joins together a representation of an end (doing B) with
a representation of a means (doing A) where my grip on what it is to do A is in an
important sense prior to my understanding of it as a means of doing B. When the
beginner skier is still following a taught routine, he relies on a grip of the elements
of making a parallel turn that is prior to their being means to making a parallel turn:
his knowledge how to do it consists in knowing that he can do it by extending his
legs while supporting himself on the downhill pole…; and his practical thought and
intentions are correspondingly articulated. That these elements still have this degree
of independence—that have not yet been incorporated into a constitutive unity—is
part of the reason why the beginner’s turns are stilted, rigid, or unreliable, or don’t
quite hang together in the right way. By contrast, the expert skier’s knowledge that
she can make a parallel turn by explosively extending her legs while… consists in
38Here I am committed to the view that to have basic knowledge how to ski parallel turns consists
in a capacity (of some sort) to ski parallel turns. The idea that knowing how to do something consists
in the capacity (ability) to do it is widely rejected in the contemporary debate about knowledge how.
Much more would need to be said to engage the relevant discussion. Note, however, that on the view
outlined here the relevant capacity is one that can be exercised in various ways: in a teacher’s instruc-
tions or a seasoned critic’s evaluations as well as in a skier’s skiing parallel short turns; for discussion,
see Small (2014). This view therefore involves rejecting the standard assumption that capacities and
abilities are aptly specified by verb-phrases; for discussion, see also Small (2017a, 2017b).
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her (basic) knowledge how to make a parallel turn. The expert and the beginner
each have knowledge of the teleological structure of making parallel turns (and their
parallel turns each exhibit that structure, albeit to different degrees of perfection),
but whereas the beginner’s knowledge of the parts is prior to his knowledge of the
whole, for the expert things are the other way around.39
Of course, it may well be that someone who knows how to ski parallel turns would
not think of what she does in terms of explosively extending her legs, assuming the
traversing stance, etc. (her teacher might not have used the Ski-Lehrplan’s termi-
nology, for one reason). She may think of the elements of the constitutive unity
differently, through less technical concepts. In that case, the dependence of her con-
ceptions of the elements on her practicable knowledge how to ski parallel turns will
probably be evenmore pronounced (the point of the textbook, after all, is to describe
a constitutive unity as analytically as possible). That the skier has a practical grip on
these elements—something afforded by neither the default view nor the alternatives
suggested by Hornsby, Lavin, and others—might be shown in various ways: she
might try to make salient to her friend what he ought to do by swinging her legs but
not her hips in a slightly exaggerated fashion; she might increase the pressure on the
inner ski while beginning the turn, in order to fall over (to let her friend win their
race, or to show him what not to do); she might decide to work on her technique for
an hour, practisingwith a focus onmaking the opening leg extension really explosive
in order to execute a parallel turn well and on account of her insight that doing this
is a way to do that; and so on.40 That thesemight all bemanifestations of her rational
capacity to ski indicates that the structure that belongs to her constitutively unified
knowledge how to execute short parallel turns is really present in her activity—that
(pace Hornsby) it is not a projection or imposition if we discern it there, because it
is from and for her.
It might be objected that these are unusual cases, ones in which the agent deliberates
about what to, and that this deliberation is the source of the means-end complexity
in her actions. In each case, she has a special end—related to, but distinct from, the
end that belongs to knowledge how to execute short parallel turns as such (i.e. the
end of executing a parallel turn). She may deliberate about how to show her friend
what to do, how best to let him win their race, or how to practise her turns, but she
needn’t and doesn’t calculate how to execute the short parallel turns that she makes
in the course of her run down the mountain, “just like that.” Why think that when
39The distinction between constitutive and analytic unities of acts should not be overstated. In my
view, it is better construed as a continuum than as a dichotomy.
40On the idea that skills can be deliberately misused, see Aristotle,Metaphysics Θ2.
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she is just skiing, andmakes a short parallel turn “directly”, that she does so bymeans
of (among other things) assuming the traversing stance, then rapidly pulling the skis
upward, …?
As a preliminary response, it is worth pointing out that though the “pure” exercise of
a skill, which so often captures the philosophical imagination,may often be relatively
unreflective, the possession of a skill is usually not: (incipiently) analytical reflection,
imagination, and practise are characteristic activities of a skilled agent, and are cred-
ibly thought of as exercises of the skill itself.41 This should undermine the pull of
the superficially plausible idea that skill is starkly opposed to practical reason. But
more can be said. As we saw, Lavin attempts to make palatable the claim that the
spatiotemporal structure of intentional action is a genuine structure of means and
ends by appealing to the idea that “a subject who moves self-consciously through
space [and time]… grasps [their continuous magnitudes] at least intuitively” (2013,
287); Thompson makes a similar point, insisting that “the human will is the will of
an intrinsically spatial”—or better, spatiotemporal—“sort of being” (2008, 111). In
support of my corresponding point about the inner rational or conceptual structure
of basic know-how (and thus its exercise), we may say that our agent’s will is the
will of a skier. In possessing her skill, she exemplifies a practice.42 The practice is
teleologically articulated: its constitutive elements are the various things one can do
in skiing—stem turns, parallel turns, short parallel turns, carving turns, flat lining,
hockey stops, etc.—each of which is itself teleologically articulated into constitutive
means. If someone is really skiing, and not just sliding down a piste with skis on, then
she is doing so by means of e.g. making a series of short parallel turns. And if she
is really making a short parallel turn, she is doing so by means of doing the things
laid out in the passage from the Ski-Lehrplan. If she makes a turn by some other
means, she won’t have made a short parallel turn. One cannot be engaged in the
activity of skiing without being engaged in more determinate skiing activities; and
one cannot be engaged in themwithout being engaged in realizing their constitutive
means (contrast Hornsby, who seems to think that Jones was engaged in the activity
of buttering toast without repeatedly moving his hand along the toast then towards
the block of butter). What it is to make a short parallel turn, or to butter toast, is
not simply to bring about a certain state of affairs (that the skier is at a slightly later
time skiing down the mountain in the other direction, that the piece of toast is cov-
41When Ryle claimed that skills are “multi-track dispositions”, activities like these were among the
“wide variety of more or less dissimilar exercises” of them that he had in mind (1949, 43).
42I discuss the dependence of skills on practices in more detail in Small (2014).
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ered in butter). It is to bring these results about in specific ways.43 Thus no further
practical thought beyond an intention to do B is required, on the part of an agent
who possesses basic knowledge how to do B, for her doing B to be articulated into
its constitutive means (doing AdoingB, etc.).44
One might object that the plausibility of this account of basic know-how depends
on a restricted range of examples: knowledge how to make short parallel turns, how
to hit a topspin forehand or play the piano, etc. But what of the idea that (among
the) basic actions are bodily movements? Even if I can hit a topspin forehand “just
like that”, I can also raise my arm “just like that”. Yet it is implausible to suppose that
there is a practice of arm-raising, responsible for the inner teleological structure of
my basic knowledge how to raise my arm (which structure it seems my argument
requires, if I am not to be essentially estranged from my arm raisings).
It is important to acknowledge that knowing how, or having the ability, to raise one’s
arm is quite different from knowing how, or having the ability, to hit a forehand. Of
course, I cannot raise my arm without raising it in some determinate way; when it’s
not just to score a philosophical point, I tend to raisemy arm for a reason—to pick up
mydrink, to reach for a book, towave to a friend, to “raise the roof ”—thatwill supply
criteria for success. And the way in which I will raise my arm will differ, depending
on why I’m raising it (and where my arm was beforehand): I may bend at the elbow,
or raise it from the shoulder, or whatever. Characteristically, my bodily movements
are constitutive elements of things I have basic knowledge how to do: walk, pick up
cups, turn on light switches, hit forehands, play scales, tie shoelaces, butter toast. It
is by learning how to do things (that are not specified as bodily movements) that we
develop control of our bodies, and those things we learn how to do are constitutive
unities of acts. The idea of a “pure” arm raising is, on this view, derivative: it is an
abstract union of those constitutive elements of reaching, grasping, signaling, etc.
that involve raising my arm. Though more could be said about how to understand
bodily movement as such, this should be enough to indicate a view that meshes with
43This opens a normative gap between exercising a skill properly and achieving the intended effect:
Jones’s butteringmight have been slapdash, yet the toast endedupbuttered adequately to his purposes;
the skier might have crashed despite executing her short parallel turn properly because her ski fell off.
There may be many ways to skin a cat, but bringing it about that a cat is skinned is not one of them
(Baier 1970).
44Cf. Hanser (1998), who argues that an individual agent can “tap into” “autonomous
teleologies”—his examples are the teleologies of machines (i.e. instruments) and of jobs (i.e. social
endeavours)—with the result that her actions may inherit means-end structure, even if that structure
“originate[s]…outside [her] will” (399).
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the account of basic know-how and action I’ve articulated.45
conclusion
The negative aim of this paper was to show that it’s far more difficult to give an ad-
equate account of basic action than most philosophers have thought. An adequate
account is required because of a regress that presents itself to a straightforward piece
of reflection on the structure of intentional action, the pattern of practical reasoning,
and the practicability of know-how: if we cannot understand basic action, we can-
not understand intentional action at all. Those philosophers who adopt a picture
of basic action on which it is the upshot of skills, conceived of as sub-personal or
non-rational dispositions, are saddled—whether they recognize it or not—with the
following unenviable task: theymust explain howbasic action has not been rendered
alien to the order of practical thought and intentional action for which it is supposed
to provide the foundation. While practical thought and rationality are conceived of
as extrinsically related to skill and basic action, this difficulty will arise. The con-
ception of intentional action as essentially teleologically articulated that we arrive at
by taking seriously the phenomenon underlyingThompson’s and Lavin’s arguments
against dominant conceptions of basicness helps us to see why “action” that practi-
cal thought does not permeate must be (at best) less than fully intentional—why it
cannot be from and for the agent. But those arguments threaten to leave us with the
claim—shown by the regress not to be intelligible absent an alternative framework—
that what it is to do something intentionally is to do it by intentionally doing some-
thing else.
The positive aim of this paper was to show the way out of this impasse. I suggest
we reject two parallel assumptions: that if a basic action does not have the kind of
teleological complexity that belongs to non-basic action, then it must be teleologi-
cally unstructured (“simple”); and that if basic know-how does not have the kind of
teleological complexity that belongs to non-basic know-how, then it must be tele-
ologically unstructured (“simple”), too. If we recognize that exercising non-basic
know-how is one way, but not the only way, in which an action may have teleolog-
ical structure, then we open the possibility that basic action could have, from and
for the agent, the inner structure that it needs to have in order to be a genuine case
of intentional action, and thus to be something by means of doing which an agent
45For further discussion of bodily movement, see Small (2016).
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could perform a non-basic intentional action. But we cannot recognize this properly
unless we also acknowledge that basic know-how itself is teleologically structured,
albeit in a specifically different form (a “constitutive unity of acts”) from that taken
by non-basic know-how (an “analytical unity of acts”); otherwise we will be con-
demned, with Lavin, to search hopelessly for the inner structure of basic actions
solely in the material circumstances in which basic know-how, lacking any deter-
minate content for the agent, is exercised. The upshot of my proposal is that skill
and deliberation are not starkly opposed, as they are often taken to be; rather, they
are specifically different forms that practical reason’s exercise can take. These dif-
ferent manifestations are not only complementary but essentially interdependent:
non-basic intentional action, and the planning and deliberation that sustains it, is
possible only if practical reason informs skilled action; and skilled action is intelli-
gible as an expression of human agency at its rational and intentional best only if
it is understood to manifest powers of practical reason for the sake of the complex
intentional agency that characterizes human life. Understanding basic action, and
genuinely avoiding the regress, becomes a matter of understanding how the exercise
of skill, considered as a rational capacity, can have the internal teleological structure
that belongs to intentional action as such.46
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